Thispaper investigates the circumstances under which a firm will be forced into
Introduction
• Economists have long actively pursued the development of a normative and positive understanding of corporate financial decisions. While they have achieved major breakthroughs, 1 they have yet to formulate a complete model of the determinants of corporate financial policy which incorporates the important realities of taxes, bankruptcy costs, investment and depreciation, and uncertainty. Such a model is important because issues such as the impact of corporate taxation on the static and dynamic efficiency of the allocation of capital within the economy hinge on corporate financial behavior. This paper addresses itself to an important aspect ofthe problemofunderstanding corporate financialpolicy-namely, the choice (bycreditors) and the timing ofbankruptcy for a firm in a "financial crisis." 2 A puzzle offinancial economics is why apparently sound companies retain earnings and even issue new equity in the face of apparent tax advantage of debt finance. Miller (1977) and Bradford (1977) have recently addressed this question, but no consensus has been reached. Firms frequently state that without such additions to equity, their credit rating would be lowered and debt costs increased. In other words, they view the marginal cost of debt finance asexceeding the interest rate they face, while the marginalcost ofequity finance is lower than their earnings/price ratio. One must ask, then, how a firm determines its optimal debt-equity ratio and why the supply curve of borrowed funds has this significant positive slope. The apparent answers involve the real costs of bankruptcy and the increased probability of bankruptcy associated with more leverage. To incorporate such considerations into economic models, it is necessary to understand the precise circumstances under which bankruptcy will occur. That is the goal of this paper.
The key consideration-addressed most notably by Stiglitz (1972) -is what determines whether a short-term lender will force bankruptcy and liquidation or instead renew or expand credit to a financially troubled company. A more primary question is why bankruptcy should ever occur if the process involves real costs (i.e., the proceeds realized are less-than-the worthofthe firm). In such circumstances avoiding bankruptcy is always in the interest of the claimants of the firm taken as a whole, and liquidation occurs only because there is a conflict of interest among the various claimants of the firm and an asymmetry in their negotiating and controlling abilities.3 Such differences among creditors are a key factor in our model, and our primary results depend on it. We demonstrate that in a model with three classes of asymmetrical claimants, actions taken with respect to bankruptcy are not always those which maximize the total value of claims on the firm. Our first conclusion is that a negative net worth is not a sufficient condition to force a firm into bankruptcy. Second, we present cases in which a firm continues operating even though its liquidation valueexceedsits present expected ongoing value, and then weillustrate the opposite situation. Finally, we investigate the effects of taxes and tax credits on the bankruptcy decision and consider merging with a healthy company as an alternative to liquidation.
Classes of claimants on the assets and income flows of the firm
• Our model includesthree classes ofclaimants on theassetsand income:fi §~ws ofthe firm: the bondholders, the bank lenders, and the equity holders. The two debt classes are differentiated in several respects. The bondholders are a noncohesive group ofinvestors who have a fixed time pattern ofclaims on the firm should it remain in business. Their noncohesive nature4 implies that they 2 Several other researchers are working on other approaches to and aspects of the larger problem (see, for example, Aumann and Kurz (1976) , Leland and Pyle (1976) , Myers (1975) , and Ross (1976) ).
We are assuming that "subjective" contracts calling for all controlling parties to avoid uneconomic bankruptcies (bankruptcies not in the total interest~fztheclaimants)arnot~permitted.
'~You can think of them as many small individual investors. cannot negotiate to alter the terms of their loan when bankruptcy becomes a possibility, while the term structure of their claims locks them into the firm to the extent of their continuing loan should the firm stay in business.
The bondholders have three indentures in their contract. First, failure to pay the bondholders any part of their interest or principal causes immediate default. Second, the bond debt is suchthat sale ofthe flrm's physical plant causes immediate default. Third, there are sufficient restrictions on dividends so that no dividends can be paid in the financial crisis described in this paper. 5 The priority distribution of assets when a default occurs depends on the covenants specific to the bonds, and we shall examine several possibilities later.
The claims and position of the bank lenders are substantially different. For example, bank loans come due each period, and even more importantly, banks have the ability to negotiate with the equity holders to alter the terms of their loans in case the firm experiences financial difficulties. We hope to establish the circumstances under which it is in the interest of the banks to make such accommodating adjustments in their terms. It is important to distinguish between those banks with large loans (relative to the total ongoing or liquidation value of the firm) and those with only small holdings. In fact, we shall assume that thereis only one bank in the former category (or that the group of such banks acts as a cohesive negotiating unit). The bank with the large loan recognizes that under certain financial conditions ofthe firm it holds the powerto decide whether to force bankruptcy or to extend sufficient credit to permit continuance.
We shall argue later that while the equity holders could conceivably attempt a sale of new equity or bonds when in a position of potential bankruptcy, it is always better for the equity investors to deal directly with the large bank creditor. To allow the firm to avoid bankruptcy, the bank must provide the extra funds necessary to pay creditors who hold current claims. As one would expect, the larger these amounts (which to the bank are a cost to be weighed against the portion of the bankruptcy losses which it must bear), the less likely is continuance.
In the event of financial difficulties, the small bank lenders will be among those demanding their loan repayments. They reason that the eventual decision (bankruptcy or continuance) is independent of their actions with respectto loan renewal, and therefore, their optimal strategy is to bail out at the first sign of trouble. For simplicity, we shall not explicitly consider small bank lenders in our model, although it should be clear that from an analytical viewpoint their loans can be lumped with the bondholders' current claim in making the bankruptcy decision in financial crises.
Since the equity holders are the residual claimants, they always seek to avoid bankruptcy. (Assumptions in Section 4 imply that the equity holders receive nothing if the firm is liquidated.) In a financial crisis the equity holders always seek to convince the bank to keep the firm in business by offering enough ofthe equity position to make the bank's claim with continuance more valuable than with bankruptcy. We shall assume that if the equity holders can If some dividends were allowed, then the equity holders would pay out the maximum permissible in this situation. In this way they would secure for themselves some of the assets of the firm. Our model might be thought of as coming into play immediately after the maximum dividend payout permitted has been made. satisfy the bank in this way without foregoing their entire position, then a deal will be arranged and the firm will stay in business.
Treating the bank and equity holders as a coalition in ourmodel introduces three basic differences from treating equity holders separately. First, while the bank and the equity holders collaborate during a financial crisis, they are adversaries when the firm is doing well. 6 Second, while dividends typically may be restricted by bond indenture, bank loan interest and principal may be partiallypaid during a financialcrisis .~' Third, the banks and equity holders combined may have a claim in bankruptcyproceedings, whereas pure equity holders would not.
Clearly, the bank's decision hinges on the value of its position under continuance versus what it receives with liquidation. Since there are various ways to divide the liquidation proceeds among the claimants, the procedure to be followed has an important bearing on the bank's decision. One technique, which we term a hierarchical structure, would pay the bond principal claim first, the bank claim second, and finally the interest payments. An alternative would divide the liquidation funds equally per dollar of (face value)8 bank or bond claim against the firm, again paying all principal amounts before making any interest payments. Our analysis can incorporate both of these cases as well as other possibilities for liquidation distribution.9
General conditions for bankruptcy
• Given the three classes of claimants just discussed, it is possible to define the general circumstances under which bankruptcy will occur. Let P = present expected value of future earnings of the plant; L = liquidation value of the plant; C cash or liquid assets of the firm; = present expected value ofthe claim ofthe (large loan) bank if the firm is allowed to continue one more period with the additional loans granted at the same interest rate; Rb = value of the (large loan) bank's claim under immediate bankruptcy; present expected value ofthe claim ofbondholders with continuance; Db = value of the bondholders' position under immediate bankruptcy; present expected value of the equity holders' claim with continuance; and = equity holders' bankruptcy claim (assumed to be zero). 6 Because our model only discusses firms already in a financial crisis, this distinction is not employed in the paper.
In a two-creditor model, typically a firm prevented from paying dividends will stay in business when, if it were allowed to pay a dividend, it would go bankrupt. With three creditors the ability to pay out some cash to the banks increases the likelihood that the firm will stay in business.
S The fact that liquidation claims are always settled with regard to face values permits situations where long-term creditors (locked into low interest rate loans) may prefer bankruptcy to continuation.
An interesting intermediate possibility is where the bondholders have placed a contractual limitation on the amount of equal priority debt which can be issued by the firm. The reason bondholders might desire such a clause is that the issuance of additional equal priority debt dilutes their liquidation claim (particularly if the proceeds eliminate equity through dividend payouts or stock repurchases).
While all ofthe claims under continuance are uncertain, the entire uncertainty is generated by the randomness in the productivity of the plant, P. The banks and equity management are assumed as insiders to have identical perceptions of the probability distribution of productivity. Bondholders and other "outsiders" are less certain about the value of the firm, but take signals from the actions ofthe bank and the management. For example, were the bank to try to buy up the outstanding debt with the intention of keeping the firm out of bankruptcy, individual bondholders would immediately revalue their claims, taking into account the revised chance of bankruptcy. Thus, the bank cannot resolve the conflict of interest by internalizing it.' 0 With the simple and general notation just defined, the liquidation value of the firm is C + L, while the ongoing present expected value is C + P. The following two identities are simple aggregation properties:
(2) They state that under either bankruptcy or continuance, the sum of the three claims equals the value of the assets. Bankruptcy costs, BC, are captured as the difference between P and L, BC=P-L.
(3)
P may be greater than or less than L. Reasons why P may exceed L include the distressed prices one may realize in liquidation (the fact that the plant is being sold possibly biases outsiders' estimates of F) and the lawyer's costs and other transaction costs incurred via sale and bankruptcy. L may also exceed P. For example, afirm in a financial crisis may be allowed to sell out to-a-competit-or, giving the combined firm extra monopoly power. Such a sale might have been prohibited by the government if both firms were financially healthy. Also, a purchaser of a durable good will generally prefer to buy from a firm which is going to stay in business.
Bankruptcy occurs in this framework when the two negotiating claimants, the bank and the equity holders, have a more valuable joint claim under bankruptcy than with continuation. That is, if Eb+Bb>EC+BC, (4) then bankruptcy occurs. However, since we are assuming Eb = 0, this can be written as EC<Bb-BC.
(5)
We know that the equity holders want to avoid bankruptcy if at all possible and, if necessary, they will offer the bank a portion of their equity (if such is legal), warrants or convertibility privileges, orhigher interest rates to entice the bank to extend the necessary credit forcontinuance. The limit on how much they can increase the value of the bank's claim with continuance above B~is obviously E~. Thus, one interpretation of(S) is simply that a firm will go bankrupt if the bank's continuation claim is less than or equal to its bankruptcy claim, even after the equity holders have forfeited their entire claim to the bank.
There also are legal barriers to the bank's acquiring high-risk bonds.
A completely equivalent condition for bankruptcy, which has a slightly different interpretation, can be derived from equations (1) This inequality simply states that bankruptcy will occur if bankruptcy costs (P -L) are less than the bondholders' gain from continuation. That is, if the total gain from continuation (the foregone bankruptcy costs) is less than the bondholders' gain, the remaining claimants, who have the decision power, must be worse off with continuation and will choose liquidation. (5) and (6) describe the general conditions under which bankruptcy will occur. To explore those conditions further and to highlight their significance, we shall develop a more specific framework, which limits the scope and complexity ofthe study in three respects. First, the entire analysis of the remaining sections is carried out in a two-period framework, a simplification with little or no cost to our results. Second, the creditors are taken to be risk neutral.' 1 Finally, the firm is assumed to be in an immediate financial crisis. The two conditions which define a financial crisis are a negative net worth and insufficient cash to pay all of the current claims of the debt holders. Together these conditions imply that the firm faces the nontrivial possibility ofimmediate bankruptcy.12
Introduction of a specific model U Equations
The balance sheet of the firm in period one looks as follows:
P(L) r,+D,+D 2
where C, F, and L are as defined previously, B, is the principal outstanding to the bank (r11B, is the bank interest due in period one), and r,, D,, D2 are respectively bond interest due in period one, bond principal due in period one, and the face value of bonds which mature in period two. The assumption of an initial financial crisis can be represented by the following three conditions:
11 Allowing creditors to be risk averse would not change the character of our results, but would complicate the analysis.
12 One way to think about how the firm got into this financial crisis is to assume the occurrence of an "earthquake." This may be taken either literally or figuratively, but the important assumption is that the expected future productivity of the firm's plant decreased discontinuously. We do not attempt to explain the firm's precrisis financing. Further, the suddenness of the financial difficulties allows us to avoid considering the type of dynamic adjustments which would be possible if the firm's prospects gradually deteriorated. While the "earthquake" cannot have been forecast with certainty, the investors may have been cognizant of its possibility.
We believe that the characterization of the onset of the financial crisis as a sudden event is often realistic. The most common sudden disclosure is the annual audited financial statement of the firm. More unusual "earthquakes" involved the effects of the formation of OPEC and the energy crisis on Christmas tree lighting companies and on the prospects of manufacturers of automobiles with poor mileage (particularly Mazda). An additional example is the calculator boom and the impact of the entrance of such companies as Texas Instruments and Rockwell into that market on the prospects of earlier manufacturers such as Bowmar.
C + P<(1+ rB)B, + r, +D, + D 2(l+rD)
C+L<(l +rB)B,+rl+D,+D2
(8)
The first two define a negative net worth condition, while the third states that there is insufficient cash to pay all current claims. In inequality (7), rD is the interest rate paid on the bonds coming due in the second period (D2), while the rate ofdiscount used by the bank is i, which is equal to the rate ofreturn it is willing to accept on a riskless one-periodinvestment. Thus, the right-hand side of (7) represents the present value of all the liabilities of the firm, if these debts were certain of being completely paid off when due. We also assume that the firm's major business operations (valued at P) cannot be partially liquidated to avert a cash shortage. For analytic purposes, any assets of the firm which can be readily sold separately from the major operations are categorized with cash. This implicitly assumes that these assets can be liquidated at their full going concern value. The additional funds required to pay off period one's claims are
and we assert that the equity holders have no source for this money which dominates obtaining it from the bank. Consider three possible means of raising the necessary funds: issuing new equity, issuing additional bonds, or renewing or enlarging its bank loans. Under any of these alternatives the equity holders must give up a claim worth at least as much as the proceeds, with strict equality holding in a competitive environmentwith perfect information. This implies that external sales of equity or bonds cannot possibly raise sufficient cash to prevent bankruptcy if the condition given by inequality (5) (or the equivalent (6)) holds. There are several reasons why the bank source may be optimal. One is that if the terms ofthe existing outstanding bonds permit further equal priority debt to be issued (either to banks or to new bondholders), these sources dominate the issuance ofnew equity. Unlike a new equity issue, new debt issues in this case have a bankruptcy claim and therefore necessarily reduce the bankruptcy claim of the existing bondholders. The ceiling which bondholders put on the issuance ofequalpriority debt exists, ofcourse, to put a floor on their fraction of the liquidation proceeds.' 3 So far we have argued that the bank is always at least as good a source of additional funds as external markets and that in some cases a new equity issue is a distinctly inferior strategy. In reality, the issuance and information costs of new external issues in the midst ofa financial crisis are probably prohibitively high. The bank, however, has some familiarity with the situation, may have an interest in the firm's avoiding bankruptcy, and can negotiate with and closely monitor the behavior of the management. For all of the above reasons, we are '~It is always in the combined interest of the banks and equity holders to convert equity (securities which do not participate in the division of bankruptcy proceeds) to loans with a bankruptcy claim. Therefore, the only circumstance under which the firm will not afready be constrained as to further issuance of priority debt is when the firm faces another restriction. One such possible restriction mightbe a rule prohibiting the firm from using theproceeds ofa priority loan for the retirement of outstanding equity.
going to assume that the source of all new funds to the firm in financial crises is the bank.
If continuation is chosen, the plant liquefies in period two into a random amount of cash~(i.e., it fully depreciates). The face value of the bank claim in period two is B 2 = (1 + rB)Bl + r1 + D1 -C, while that of the outstanding bond debt is D2. There are no bankruptcy costs in period two, 14 so that in some sense we are comparing the choice of immediate forced versus deliberate liquidation.
To determine the bankruptcy decision we are going to examine inequality (6), which stated that bankruptcyis chosen if P -L < D~-Db. As P and L are known observable magnitudes, we need only determine the present expected value of the bondholders' claim under the two choices.
Consider first the present expected value of the bondholders' claim under continuation. To avoid bankruptcy the bondholders must receive an immediate payment of r 1 + D1 and an amount in period two which depends upon 'k and the rules of dividing up the cash generated from the plant. The value of the bondholders' position obviously depends on the probability distribution of k~denoted f(~). For the time being we shall only assume that 4 = 0 and that
Further, and strictly for notational simplicity, we assume that the long-term bond interest rate rD is not greater than the bank rate rB. With this condition and the notation above, we can solve for D~.
If all debt claims are treated with equal priority in the disbursal of 4, the present expected value of the bondholders' continuation claim is given as
The determination of Db is even simpler than D~, as it involves no uncertainty, but only the magnitude of C + L and the rules of disbursement for these liquidation proceeds. There is, of course, no necessary reason why the first-period rules must be the same as those for the latter period, but we shall assume consistency. If all debt claims are treated with equal priority in bankruptcy liquidation, then the bondholders receive Equations (12) and (13) illustrate that the bankruptcy condition (6) can be evaluated for an arbitrary probability distribution function f(k) in a twoperiod model. In an earlier paper (Bulow and Shoven, 1977) , we derived analogous equations for alternative asset distribution rules. Equations of this type, however, do not readily clarify some interesting cases concerning bankruptcy choice which we illustrate in Section 5.
Numerical examples
• Examples A, B, and C will illustrate the following major results:
(1) A firm may stay in business despite having both a negative net worth and a cash shortage (examples A and C). (2) A firm may liquidate, even when the going concern value (C + P) exceeds the liquidation value (C + L) (example B). (3) A firm may stay in business, even when its liquidation value exceeds its going concern value (L > P) (example A). (4) If two firms have identical bankruptcy costs, identical variance in their returns from staying in business, identical liabilities, and assets of equal value, it is possible that the firm with more cash (though still in need ofa cash infusion from the banks) will stay in business while the one with less cash will go bankrupt (comparison of examples B and C). (5a) It is possible that a lower liquidation value (L) may improve the position of the bondholders by encouraging the bank to keep the firm operating (example B). (Sb) Conversely, given a liquidation value, a more valuable operating entity (higherP) may mean a less valuable claim for the bondholders (exampleA). (6a) Though bond debt may have only equal priority with bank debt, a lower interest rate, and a longer average duration, the inability of bondholders to negotiate may result in each dollar of bond principal receiving a higher return than each dollar of bank principal (example C). To permit continuance the bondholders essentially present an all-or-nothing proposition which is sometimes accepted. (6b) Conversely, the bond debt may be exploited, receiving a lower payoff per unit of principal than equal priority or even lower priority bank debt. The case of equal priority debt is shown in example A. This result can only occur when result (3) above occurs.
For our examples we use the simplest type of uncertainty. Ifthe expected present value of the plant's cash return is P, we assume that the distribution of~is such that the plant returns a present value of P -G with probability ½ and P + G with probability ½. We assume that bond debt and bank debt have equal priority and that principal has absolute priority over interest.~A risk-free rate of zero (i = 0) is assumed in all cases to simplify computations. If the firm goes bankrupt, the total amount to be divided is 480. Since bond principal is 250 and initial bank principal is also 250, the bonds get half ofthe 480, leaving the bank plus equity holders with the remaining 240.
Ifthe firm continues, the total expected return is 450. The bonds receive 10 now. In addition, with probability ½ they will receive their full claim of 260 in period two. Should things go badly, the firm will have 450 -346 = 104 to disburse. Hence, with probability ½ the bonds would receive 250/520 of this amount (or 50), because, while the principal on their loans has remained at 250, the principal on the bank loans has risen to 270 (250 plus the extra loan of r 1 + rBBl to keep the firm running). Thus, the total expected present value of the bondholders' claims is 10 + 130 + 25 = 165. The bank and equity holders get to share the remaining claim worth 450 -165, or 285. Clearly a deal can be negotiated whereby the bank will agree to keep this firm in business because B~+ E~= 285 > B,, = 240.
We note the following results from this example:
(1) The firm remains in business, even though its net worth is negative and it faces a cash crisis severe enough that the bank must pay out new money to keep the firm afloat. (3) The firm stays in business even though its liquidation value exceeds its going concern value. (Sb) If P were very low the bondholders would be better off because the firm would not stay in business. Figure 1 graphs the bondholders' expected return against P for G = mm (P,346). (As we can see from Figure 1 , at a P of less than 390.76 the firm will go bankrupt and the bondholders will receive 240. If the firm stays in business at P = 390.76, the present expected value ofthe claims ofthe bank plus equity holders is 240, leaving the bondholders a claim worth 150.76. As P rises (and G remains at 346) the bondholders' return rises at a slope of 25/104, returning to 240 at P = 762 and reaching its maximum of 270 (full payoff) at P~886.8.) PLANT VALUE P (6b) We also see that for the case ofP = 450 the value ofthe bond claim is only 165, while the bank's position is worth at least 240 (their share in bankruptcy), even though both have debt issues with the same principal, interest rate, and priority. While there is a bankruptcy premium of30 in example A (L -P = 30), the reason the bank plus equity holders choose to remhinin businessisth-atthe-tondholders have a small current claim (10, which can be thought of as a cost of continuance) and do not participate fully in the upper tail ofthe distribution of (note that the maximum the bondholders can get with-continuance-(270) is only 30 above their liquidation payoff, while the bank plus equity holders have a 50-50 chance at 516).16
Balance Sheet of Firm B (other relevant data included)
Ifthe firm in this example goes bankrupt, the total amount to be distrihuted is C + L = 450. Bond principal is 108 + 432 = 540, while bank principal is 135. This entitles the bondholders to i's of the liquidation value of the firm, or 360, and leaves the bank with 1/5, or 90.
If the firm remains in business, the total claim to be split is worth C + P = 540. However, of that amount r1 + D1, or 162, must go immediately to the bondholders. If the firm receives P + G, the entire bond debt would have to be paid off. This would amount to (I + r~)D2 = 480. Ifthe firm has bad luck, there will be 210 to divide. The bonds would have claim to 4/~of this amount, or 120. (The 4h is calculated by comparing the principal on the remaining bond debt (D 2 = 432), to the amount the bank must lend the firm to keep it in business (r1 + D1 + (1 + rB)B~-C = 324).) On average, the bonds would receive ½(120 + 480) or 300. Thus, if the firm remains in business, the bondholders' expectations are 162 + 300 = 462. This leaves a claim worth 540 -462 = 78 for the bank plus equity holders. Since this is less than the 90 the bank receives from a bankruptcy, the firm will go bankrupt. From example B we note the following results:
(2) A firm may liquidate even when the going concern value (C + P) exceeds the liquidation value (C + L). We note that for L < 390 the firm remains in business because the total ongoing claim ofthe bank plus equity holders is worth 78, which exceeds what the bank would realize in a bankruptcy liquidation. From L = 390 to L = 577.5 the bank will force liquidation and the bondholders will receive less than the value oftheir claim with continuation (462). The bondholders' return continues upward until L = 742.5, when the bonds receive a full claim.
The contrast between examples A and B is, of course, that in the former the banks and equity holders choose continuance even though the liquidation value exceeds the ongoing value, while in the latter the bank forces bankruptcy despite the fact that the present expected value with continuanceis substantially greater than the total liquidation proceeds. Both exhibit the possibility of decisions (actions not in the interest ofthe three creditors taken as a whole) because of the asymmetrical power and claims of the different invested parties. In example B bankruptcy was chosen largely because of the relatively high current claim of the bondholders which must be fully paid for continuance. Under bankruptcy the payment ofthe interest portion ofthat claim (54) is completely avoided by the bank, and the principal portion (108) is only fractionally settled. 17 Indeed, if the bondholders have no first-period claim, bankruptcy cannot be chosen when positive bankruptcy costs exist. In that situation the bondholders' fractional claim ofthe bankruptcy proceeds (C + L) is at least as great as their fractional claim of the expected ongoing returns (C + P). It follows that the bank plus equity holders have no larger a fractional claim on a smaller number (since L <P) in bankruptcy, and they therefore choose to remain in business.
LIQUIDATION VALUE L
In addition, firm B has a substantially larger negative net worth. 
G= 330
Bond Debt r1= 54
= 108 = 432 rD = 1/9 Firm C is identical to firm B in four vital respects: (I) its total liquidation N value (C + L) is the same; (2) its value as an ongoing concern (C + P) is the same; (3) its liabilities are identical; and (4) the variance in its income as a going concern is identical. The firms differ only in the composition oftheir asset portfolios. If continuance is chosen, the cash held by firm C will enable it to ask the bank for a smaller increase in its loan. Period-one debt claims are now paid partially with the firm's cash, rather than being financed solely by the bank as in example B. This payment ofcash reduces the expected second-period return of the bondholders (less than dollar for dollaras the bank's second period claim is also lowered). To the extent that the value ofthe bonds under continuance is lowered, the total value ofthe ongoing claim ofthe bank plus equity holders is raised. Inthis example the amount involved is sufficient to have the bank decide to continue operations. In fact, given the structure of the claims and since remaining in business is the correct "economic" decision, all three creditors end up at least as well off as in example B. In addition, in this case the bank faces a smaller all-or-nothing demand from the bondholders to permit continuance, and the demand is accepted.
If the firm chooses bankruptcy, the total proceeds again are C + L = 450. The bank gets 1/~of this amount, as in example B, or 90. Should the firm continue, there will be an expected return of 540. Again the bonds receive 162 in the first period. Ifthe firm earns P + G, then againthe bonds receive 480. However, if the firm earns P -G, there is only 102 to divide instead of the 210 ofexample B (the difference being the 108 in cash distributed in period one in this example). The bonds receive 2A of the 102, or 68 (this figure was calculated by comparing D 2, 432, with r1 + D1 + (1 + rB)Bl -C = 216). On average, then, bonds receive ½(480 + 68) = 274 in the second period as well as 162 in the first period, for a total expected return of 436. The bank plus equity holders are left with 540 -436 = 104, Which 1S more than the 90 the bank receives in bankruptcy. The firm will thus remain solvent.
18 Furthermore, the bondholders are better off, having a claim worth 436 in this example as compared to one worth 360 in example B. From example C we can note the following results:
(1) As with firm A, firm C stays in business despite facing both a negative net worth and a cash crisis. (4) As compared with firm B, a more liquid portfolio saves firm C.
(6a) Though the bonds have the same liquidation priority as the bank loans and a lower interest rate, the bondholders receive more payoff per dollar of principal than does the bank. There is fourtimes as much bond debt as bank debt (540 to 135), and the payoff is more than four times as great (436 to 104).
The inclusion of taxes and merging
• We now wish to introduce taxes into the model developed in Section 4. Tax considerations may make merging with a financially healthy corporation an attractive alternative to immediate bankruptcy or continuation. The options available to the firm are thus (1) immediate bankruptcy, (2) immediate merging, (3) continuation with (a) disbursement of period two's proceeds or (b) merging in period two. We make the following assumptions regarding the possibility of merging:
Assumption 1: A merger differs from a bankruptcy liquidation only in its tax consequences and in the increased security experienced by the bondholders.
Assumption 2: The acquiring firm is sufficiently well offthat a mergerguarantees that all outstanding bond debt will be paid offand that it can use all acquired tax credits immediately.
The first ofthese assumptions implies that the amounti~e~eived forthe plant itself in a merger is L, its liquidation value. The liability side of the balance sheet is unchanged from Section 4.
Important features of the tax system modeled in this section (meant to resemble the U.S. corporate income tax) are:
(1) A corporate tax, applied at rate 7, is imposed on income less depreciation and interest.
(2) The amountof tax paid in a period may not be negative. However, loss carryovers are permitted. Our firm has loss carryovers of K 1, which, could they be sold, would yield K17. However, such sales are prohibited, but the loss deductions can be assumed by a merger partner. 19 (3) The plant has a depreciation basis ofR, all ofwhich may be deducted in the coming period. That is, if the firm stays in business or merges, a tax deduction ofR will be allowedin the next period. Ifthe firm liquidates, the firm purchasing the plant is allowed a deduction of L instead of R. The "value" of plant P is equal to (rR
, where E(~) is the expected amount of cash the plant will produce. Thus, P is the after-tax discounted value of the returns to be generated by the plant were the tax law fully symmetrical (i.e., if the tax due in a period could be below zero).
We shall examine the choices available to a firm which can issue unlimited equal priority debt. Should the firm liquidate immediately, the bank and stockholders receive as much as in the nontax case, usually (C + L)[B 1/(B1 + D1 + D2)]. Any tax credits the firm has accumulated become worthless in bankruptcy.
If a merger occurs in the first period, the amount the buyer is willing to pay for the combined bank and equity position is (1 +rD(1-7) )
The first two terms represent the amount available from a sale of assets. The next three terms represent the present discounted cost to the acquiring firm of paying offthe acquired's debts. The sixth term, K17, is the value ofthe firm's tax credits. Since they can be used immediately, the merging partner is willing to pay full value for them. Finally, the last term, (R -L) [7/(1 + i)] , is the tax value to the purchaser of acquiring the plant in a merger (and maintaining a depreciable basis ofR) ratherthan through a sale (and changing the basis to L).
If the firm stays in business, the bank receives C --D1 in the first period. In the second period a random amount of cash 4) is produced. Define K2 as K1 + rBB2 + rDD2 + R. It represents all the deductions available to the firm 20 in period two. Then we have two possibilities:
The only case we shall examine in detail is the one in which the firm chooses to stay in business through period one. The relevant choice then becomes whether to merge in period two or simply to divide the proceeds in period two after 4) has been realized. The detailed equations necessary to compare this case with period-onebankruptcyor merging appearin Bulow and Shoven (1977) .
Ifthe firm continues in business and its gross income in-period tworis-greater than or equal to K2 (i.e., 4)~K2), the choice is trivial because all tax credits are exhausted and there is no further benefit to merging. Also, if N> (1 + rD)(D2 + B2), where N is cash after taxes, there is no possible benefit to not merging because the entire bond debt will be paid off regardless of whether a merger occurs. Four distinct cases which hinge on the relative value ofthe tax credits and on the firm's debt structure can be identified in the choice between secondperiod disbursement and merging:
(1) K27> (1 + rD)D2 and K2> (1 + rD)(D2 + B2) (2) K27> (1 + rD)D2 and K2 < (1 + rD)(D2 + B2) (3) K2r < (1 + rD)D2 and K2 > (1 + rD)(D2 + B2) (4) K2'r < (1 + rD)D2 and K2 < (1 + rD)(D2 + B2).
If 4) were zero, then K2'r would be the benefit to merging, while the cost of merging would be that the bonds, which would get nothing under disbursement, must be paid (1 + rD)D2. Inthe first two cases merging would occur ifthe amount ofcash produced (4)) were zero, while in the latter two it would not. Figures 3 and 4 show the four cases and display the choice of disbursement versus merging as a function of the outcome of the plant 4). 20 Clearly, there must be some limit on the interest rate ra; otherwise4,ysett nga high enough rate the firm could build up an arbitrarily high amount of tax credits. In reality, two forces act to limit r2. One invplves the legal problems of charging usurious interest rates. The other is the danger that at a high enough interest rate, the bank loans may come to be considered equity. Under case one merging in the second period is always at least as good as distributing assets in the second period. In this case a merger in the first period would be preferred if P~L. However, positive bankruptcy costs may lead to a postponement of the merger.
Case four is analogous in that there is never any benefit to merging in the second period. However, there may be a merger in the first period (even if P~L), if i is large. Also, if loss deductions could not be carried forward (or if the carry forward period were limited), there would be another reason to merge in the first period. In case two the benefits of merging exceed those of distributing only for small 4). Case three is the exact opposite. We can examine these two cases for the "switch point" at which a merger becomes desirable. Note that the switch point (if there is one) must occur forsome 4) <K 2 and 4) < (1 + rD)(D2 + B2). For such 4) a distribution would leave the bank plus equity holders with 4)[B2/(D2 + B2)J. A merger would give them 4) + (K2 -4))i~-(1 + rD)D2. This amount consists ofthe cash the firm has, 4), plus the value ofits remaining tax credits, (K2 -4) )7, less the amount of bond debt to be paid off, (1 + rD)D2. The condition for merger is thus which reduces to
An economic interpretation can be given to the terms in (20). As before, with 4) = Owe find the merger condition to be K27 -(1 + rD)D2> 0. Ifthe firm simply goes out ofbusiness, there is no cash to disburse and the bank receives zero. However, a merger partner would be willing to pay K27 -(1 + rD)D2 for the rights to the tax credits and the obligation to pay the bonds. We may point out here that as long as K2 > 4) the three creditors as a whole benefit from a second-period merger, but the inability ofthe bondholders to negotiate may prevent a merger from occurring.
The derivative ofthe right-hand side of (20) In case two a merger will occur if 4) is less than or equal to this critical value, with a disbursement being optimal for better outcomes. In case three the choices are reversed, with a merger's occurring only if 4) is greater than or equal to S. This analysis of the situation where the firm decides to remain in business through period one is summarized in the following matrix: The consideration of taxes and merging leads to at least two additional results illustrated by Bulow and Shoven (1977) . These are:
(1) A tax which treats losses and gains asymmetrically (such as the U.S. corporate income tax) discourages the continuance of firms in financial trouble and increases the attractiveness ofbankruptcy-or merger. This result affects only those enterprises which might experience losses sufficiently large that their taxes would be negative with a symmetric tax system. (2) Even a symmetric tax system may discourage the continuance of a firm in a financial crisis. This can occur even for a firm whose expected taxes are zero under the symmetric tax code, because a symmetric tax reduces the variance in the after-tax productivity of the plant.
These general conclusions supplement the primary effect of the inclusion of taxes, namely the potential viability ofmerging as an alternative to bankruptcy or independent continuation.
Conclusion
• Much of the previous literature has treated bankruptcy as a chance event which occurs either when the value of the equity position is zero or when the firm has a negative net worth. The former of these criteria is a mere tautology, while the latter is clearly wrong in a model with severalasymmetrical claimants of the firm. In contrast with earlier studies, we have treated bankruptcy as a decision of the bank lender where the criterion for bankruptcy is whether or not the coalition ofclaimants with negotiating power can gain from immediate liquidation. The bankruptcy choice depends on several variables in addition to the firm's net worth position and the costs of bankruptcy. The decisionmaker (in our model, the bank lender) must also take into account the maturity structure, priority structure, and the ownership of the firm's debt. Further, the choice is affected by the composition of the firm's asset portfolio and by the variability in the returns to that portfolio should the firm remain in business. All of these factors influence the division of the proceeds of the firm between the negotiating coalition (i.e., the bank and equity holders) and the nonnegotiating creditors (the bondholders). In general, a longer-term debt structure, an asset portfolio with ahigherpercentage ofcash orliquid assets, and a more variable future return all increase the circumstances under which the firm will continue operations. Whether bankruptcy is more or less likely when the bank owns a higher or lower fraction of the debt is ambiguous.
Using examples involving these various factors, we have shown that a negative net worth is not a sufficient condition for choosing bankruptcy. Further, instances where "uneconomic" decisions are made have been described with the firm either liquidating despite positive bankruptcy costs or remaining in business even though its liquidation value is in excess ofits worth as an ongoing concern. In many cases, these actions are not only incompatible with maximizing the total value of the firm, but also involve social costs. This is true if the bankruptcy costs experienced reflect the consumption of real resources (such as lawyers' time) or if the foregone bankruptcy premium reflects the fact that the physical plant of the firm has more valuable alternative uses. One case in which private bankruptcy costs do not translate into a social cost occurs when the seller's loss in a hurried, distress sale is matched by the buyer's gain.
We have shown circumstances related to these "uneconomic" outcomes where the bondholders are better off, everything else equal, if the liquidation value ofthe plant is lower. Symmetrically, in other cases it is possible that the value of the bonds is higher with a lower ongoing value of the plant. These results occur if the lower values discourage the bank from choosing an action which reduces the expected value of bonds. The asymmetry of the bonds and bank loans permits their claims to have significantly different values per dollar offace amount, even if they have the same interest rate and liquidation priority.
The addition of tax considerations may change the outcome of the firm's bankruptcy decision and opens the possibility that a merger will occur. The lack of symmetry in the tax system (negative taxes are not permitted, although loss deductions may be carried forward) generates cases in which the only way to use all current loss deductions immediately is to merge. By declaring bankruptcy the firm forfeits the value of loss carryovers. Thus, the tax system may encourage continuance or merger and discourage bankruptcy. On the other hand, the tax system reduces the variance in the net return to the plant, thereby encouraging bankruptcy. Further, the cost of a merger to the bank and equity holders is that the bondholders must be paid their full claim rather than the smaller amount they could expect with continuance or bankruptcy.
The purpose of this article has been to establish the precise conditions under which bankruptcy will occur in a model with three asymmetrical claimants on the assets and income flows ofthe firm. This knowledge is essential ifwe are to gain a clearer understanding ofcorporate behavior. The key assumption of our model was that the bank plus equity holders have the bankruptcy decision power and act in their own joint interest, not considering the outcome of the third set of claimants, the bondholders. The actions of the bank plus the equity holders are therefore not based on maximizing the total value of the firm and may be taken at the expense of the bondholders. The corporate tax system creates further possibilities for actions which conflict with maximizing the value of the firm. The difficult but important task which remains is to integrate the type ofmodel we have presented with other aspects of corporate financial decisions.
